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HomeMy WebLinkAbout08-14-07Little Rock Board of Directors Reconvened Meeting — Minutes — August 14, 2007 MINUTES BOARD OF DIRECTORS RECONVENED MEETING City Hall — 500 W. Markham August 14, 2007 - 4:00 PM The Board of Directors of the City of Little Rock, Arkansas met in a reconvened session with Mayor Stodola presiding. Nancy Wood, City Clerk, called the roll with the following Directors present: Hendrix, Keck, Wright, Wyrick, Richardson, Cazort, Kumpuris, Adcock, Vice Mayor Hurst, and Mayor Stodola. Director Fortson was absent. 1. RESOLUTION NO. 12,568 - To ratify appointments and reappointments to the Arkansas Arts Center Board of Trustees; and for other purposes. Synopsis: The Arts Center has requested the approval of the following candidates for appointment or reappointment to the Board of Trustees: Lisa Baxter, Hugh McDonald, Libby Sheard, Sharon Bailey, Bob Birch, Karen Cline, Jesse Mason, and Dr. A. Henry Thomas. A motion was made by Director Keck, seconded by Director Cazort, to adopt the resolution. By unanimous voice vote of the Board Members present, the resolution was passed. Director Fortson was absent. 2. DISCUSSION - Pulaski County Regional Detention Center Tom Carpenter, City Attorney, gave an overview on issues concerning the Pulaski County Regional Jail Facility which addressed jail overcrowding; what constitutes if a jail is unconstitutional; and medical treatment for prisoners. He stated the County has a constitutional duty to make needed hospital care available to a detainee, but neither the County nor the Sheriff is required to pay for that treatment. If the detainee is indigent, then the County need only take the person to a hospital that treats indigents, and not accept financial responsibility for such treatment. Mr. Carpenter addressed some issues of concern that came out of the University of Arkansas at Little Rock (UALR) Report, regarding whether persons sentenced to imprisonment from district courts must be accepted by a county jail. He said that state law was clear as it states "Neither a sheriff nor another keeper or administrator of a jail shall refuse to accept any prisoner lawfully arrested or committed within the jurisdiction of the supporting agency of the jail except as necessary to limit prisoner population (to comply with the laws and the Arkansas Constitution and within the requirements of the United Stated Constitution). The issue of whether maintaining a contract with the federal government to hold federal prisoners is appropriate when the jail cannot meet its obligations to the local governments was addressed. He stated the State probably can say when and how long to keep its prisoners, it appears the contract the county has to hold federal prisoners is voluntary. Medical treatment of detainees was an issue from the UALR report that Mr. Carpenter addressed. He cited that the report makes more than one statement as to the responsibility for medical treatment that suggests there are no alternatives. Mr. Carpenter said that State statute mandates that the University of Arkansas Medical School to provide indigent care. (Arkansas Code Ann. 6 -64 -501 (West 2004). 1 Little Rock Board of Directors Reconvened Meeting — Minutes — August 14, 2007 Since this statute is part of the education laws of Arkansas, it is obviously a reference to the fact that UAMS (University of Arkansas Medical Sciences) campus and many of its doctors are provided substantial financial support by the State. He said it is true this statute would permit UAMS to determine a methodology to assess partial payment to counties and cities with a population in excess of 10,000, but UAMS has never developed such a formula. While the obligation to treat indigents is present, the fact that UAMS cannot assess the County or the City any costs for such treatment is simply because the University has not developed the formula to do to. (A copy of Mr. Carpenter's Memorandum concerning "Issues Concerning the Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility ", dated August 14, 2007 is attached to the minutes.) There was a lengthy discussion regarding the issues presented. The Board was adamant that the County understand the seriousness of the jail not taking the City's prisoners, and questioned whether there would be any cooperation from the County, and if they would even answer the questions the City Attorney has proposed. Directors Keck and Director Kumpuris stated that since this information was presented only a couple of hours ago, and there was a lot of information to digest, they hoped that the Board would use this information for discussion purposes only tonight, and then come back later for either more discussion or action, to try and get more information and questions answered, and get the County's responses to the questions the City Attorney has proposed, and asked the City Attorney to make the Board aware of any possible consequences if a law suit is filed. There was a request that an assessment of the County's finances be presented. The Board requested that the other cites with interlocal contracts be contacted for their input. There was a consensus that the new Sheriff has been very willing to work and cooperate with the City, and asked if he and /or other County representatives might be asked to come and make a presentation, and stand for questions from the Board. Director Adcock made the motion to recess this meeting and reconvene on August 28, 2007, and to separate the medical issue from the resolution to seek injunction. Director Cazort seconded the motion and by unanimous voice vote of the Board members present the meeting was recessed at 6:05 PM. ATTEST: Ndde �Ierk oo C City APPROVED: G� Mark Stodola Mayor 2 4� rvr, OFFIC'T; OF TI-II? CITY AT TOI2NEY Little Peck, Arkansas MEMORANDUM TO: Mayor Stodola and Members of the Board of Directors FROM: Thomas M. Carpenter City Attorney Re: Issues Concerning the Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility DATE: 14 August 2007 This memorandum is an update of issues that impact the Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility ( "the PCRDF "). With the attachment of prior memoranda on this topic, this information is to help with the public discussion at today's agenda discussion. Rather than repeat in detail the topics covered by the prior information presented to the Board of Directors, this memorandum updates issues that need to be discussed. Also, I will point out some issues addressed in Breaking the Crime Chain: Making Pulaski County Safe ( "the UALR Report"), which need clarification. .1. UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS Pulaski County ( "the County ") and the Pulaski County Sheriff ( "the Sheriff") both claim that they cannot operate an unconstitutional jail. As a general rule, this statement is correct. The dis- agreements revolve around who decides that a jail is unconstitutional, and what do the various federal courts find to be unconstitutional? The first answer is that a court — probably a federal district court, or a federal court of appeals — makes the determination as to constitutionality. The answer to the second question is that because these courts recognize many of the current prob- lems faced by cities and counties throughout the country in terms of jail populations, the strict standards that were once required have now been relaxed. A. Jail Overcrowding The most immediate issue is what constitutes "jail overcrowding" in a constitutional sense? The issue arises with the PCRDF because the limitations on prisoners accepted by the Sheriff have more to do with budget matters than with legal requirements. One reason that this issue has not been more carefully explored in various task forces and reports is that the conclusions are expressed more in terms of what County's representatives are doing as opposed to what they can do. OFFICE, OF THIi CITY A TORNEN Memorandum to Mayor Stodola & Members of the Board of Directors Re: Issues Concerning the Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility 13 August 2007: Page 2 of 9 For example, for some period of time the County relied upon federal litigation which in- volved the old Pulaski County jail as the reason for closing the jail. Under the federal court case, occupancy of the old jail was limited to 200 prisoners for many years until U.S. District Judge George Howard permitted double bunking in one pod that allowed 240 prisoners. When the PCRDF was built, the federal litigation was still ongoing, but after a stipulation was entered be- tween the parties, and in force for a period of time, Judge Howard ended the litigation. The sig- nificance of this fact is that the Court did not maintain any oversight jurisdiction over the PCRDF and, further, included in the final order a statement that no additional litigation was to be filed in the matter. Therefore, at present, no state or federal court has ruled that the PCRDF is unconstitutional because of overcrowding. What constitutes overcrowding in a. constitutional sense? The U.S. Supreme Court has al- ready ruled that double bunking is not unconstitutional. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1971). The various federal courts to review the issue have gone farther to deal with the prob- lems that local governments are having. For example, in Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150 (3rd CIT. 2005), the Third Circuit rejected a claim that placing three persons in a cell designed for one person was not unconstitutional. In Hubbard, the plaintiff said that he had to place his mattress in such a way that a prisoner would stand over him to urinate or use the toilet. Even so, the tempo- rary nature of the situation kept it from being unconstitutional. The average length of time a pre- trial detainee stayed in jail in Hubbard was sixty (60) days. In Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4 °i Cir. 1993), the detainee complained that not only was the jail engaged in double bunking (having two prisoners in a cell designed for one), but also requiring others to sleep on mattresses on the day room floor. The Fourth Circuit clearly stated that double or triple bunking was not per se unconstitutional. 989 F.2d at 1385. The claim in Strickler also included allegations that, because of the double and triple bunking, the ventila- tion was poor leading to uncomfortable conditions, and that during cold spells the cells and day - room were cold. Yet, the Fourth Circuit did not deem these conditions unconstitutional over- crowding because slight discomfort or stuffiness does not create a constitutional situation. As long as the jail provided detainees with blankets during cold when it was cold, there was no de- liberate indifference to the conditions. Secs also Wilson v. Griffon, 952 F.2d 820, 824 (4t" Cir. 1991). Most recently, the fact of triple bunking (three detainees in a cell designed for two persons) for a period of ten (10) months was found not to state an unconstitutional condition. In fact, the Court stated that: [o]vercrowding has become a./act of life in prisons, and the need for inmates to be housed in a secure location underlies this legitimate governmental purpose. Crocamo v. Hudson Cty. Corr. Fac., 2007 WL 1 l 75753 at *4 (emphasis added). These cases recognize a legitimate governmental purpose in keeping criminals in a secure environment. If the result is that overcrowding occurs, even for a period of up to ten (10) months, OFFICE, OF TI EI CITY ATTORNEY Memorandum to Mayor Stodola & Members of the Board of Directors Re: Issues Concerning the Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility 13 August 2007: Page 3 of 9 and certainly for a period of 60 days, then that is what occurs. Absent anything else, such a situa- tion does not create a constitutional bar to accepting prisoners into an overcrowded facility. Incidentally, the Stipulation referred to above in the County jail litigation included a promise by the County that it would hold eighty (80) prisoners per guard. in other words, if the County provided just two more guards, that would enable the PCRDF to hold one hundred and sixty (160) additional prisoners even according to standards the County has accepted. B. Other Conditions of Confinement Additional questions about jail populations address the conditions of confinement. One issue is what standard have the federal courts used to determine if a county jail is unconstitutional. In the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8t1' Circuit, which includes Arkansas, the proof requirements are clear: (1) the county officials have to know of the conditions; (2) this knowledge includes realizing that these conditions will cause a specific harm; and (3) the county officials demonstrate deliberate indifference to the situation by ig- noring any obligation to do anything about the potential harm. Crow v. Montgomery, 403 F.3d 598, 602 (9t1' Cir. 2005). All three of these factors must exist be- fore there is governmental liability. The phrase "deliberate indifference" is a legal term of art that has a specific meaning. The U.S. Supreme Court defines the term as follows: "The deliber- ate- indifference requirement is satisfied only if [the official] knows that the [detainees] face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994). When this definition is applied, it is clear that the County officials have not demonstrated deliberate indifference to the situation, nor have they ignored an obligation to do something about the PCRDF. Indeed, in addition to previ- ous task forces, and unsuccessful attempts to approve countywide sales and use taxes to pay for the jail, the officials recently cooperated in the L1ALR Report to help determine possible solu- tions. What kinds of actions constitute deliberate indifference? Although not concluding that the facts supported such a finding, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that when part of a sentence in a county jails includes a condition imposed for the purpose of punishment, ' There are two constitutional claims on conditions of confinement (1) for persons convicted of crime, an Eighth Amendment challenge to cruel and unusual punishment; or (2) for pretrial detainees, the same basic standard, except the claim is made through the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since a pretrial detainee has not been convicted of an offense. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979); Owens v. Scott Cty. Jail, 328 F.2d 1026 (8 "' Cir. 2003) (per curiam). While the courts have suggested that there may be some different standard for pretrial detainees, such a difference has not been articulated to date, OFFICE: OF THE CITY .ATTOR'NE;Y Memorandum to Mayor Stodola & Members of the Board of Directors Re: Issues Concerning the Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility 13 August 2007: Page 4 of 9 the condition runs afoul of the U.S. Constitution. Hamilton v. Lyons, 74 F.3d 99, 106 (5t1i Cir. 1996). For example, deliberate indifference is demonstrated if a county ,jail denies the right to shelter when detainees are required to sleep on mattresses on a wet floor because of roof leaks the mattresses soak up the water, and the temperature is cold for a significant period of time. Spencer v. Brouchard, 449 F.3d 721, 728 (6tl' Cir. 2006). Even so, the fact that such a condition occurs does not make it unconstitutional; the courts must also find from the totality of circum- stances, that the nature of the deprivation, and its duration, demonstrate a desire to punish. Wil- son v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991). So, even the most difficult situations do not demonstrate deliberate indifference. In June 2003, the conditions at the Cullman County Jail. were deplorable. The facil- ity was old, overcrowded and in disrepair. Cells could not be locked for fear that they could not be opened in an emergency; as a result, inmates were free to move between cells and day rooms. Because of extreme overcrowding, inmates were forced to sleep on mattresses in hallways, corridors, and day rooms. Inmates had uncontrolled ac- cess to cleaning supplies, including a mop and chemicals that were used in the attack on Moore. Applying the test we set, forth in Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir. 2001), and construing the evidence in the light most . favorable to Moore, the district court,, found that these conditions posed a substantial risk of serious harm to the jail's inmates. The district court held, however, that no violation of Moore's constitutional rights had occurred because the Defendants were not deliberately in- different to the risk. We agree. Moore v. Cullum Cty. Comm, 'n, 2006 W L 952276 at * 1 (11th Cir. 2006)(emphasis added). Recently, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that disgusting condi- tions did not automatically constitute deliberate indifference. The evidence include testimony that there was "paper and food and stuff on the floor' ; that there was hair, dried "mucus, spit, [and] vomit" in the sink; and that there was "dried human waste" on the toilet seat. (Tr. at 118.) Whitnack likewise testified that there was "a partially - eaten pear" and "a partially -eaten sandwich" on the floor; that there were "cigarette butts and ashes on the desk "; that there was hair, vomit, and spit in the sink; that there was dried human waste on the toilet seat; that there was garbage in the toilet bowl, that there were dried puddles of urine on the floor; and that there was dried "snot" on the wall. Whitnak v. Douglas Cty., 16 F.3d 954 (8tl' Cir. 1994). To be sure, the Court did not like the con- ditions in Douglas County. However, it found that the conditions were temporary, and the fact that prisoners were expected to clean cells was significant in the Court's refusal to declare the conditions to be unconstitutional. OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY Memorandum to Mayor Stodola & Members of the Board of Directors Re: Issues Concerning the Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility 13 August 2007: Page 5 of 9 --- The outcome of this case is largely dependent on the very short period of time dur- ing which the plaintiffs were confined in Cell C -18 before they were given full and adequate cleaning supplies. "Conditions, such as a filthy cell, may `be tolerable for a. few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months. "'.. . intolerable conditions lasted not more than 24 hours before the availability of adequate cleaning supplies would make them tolerable. We recently reasoned that a prisoner confined to an al- legedly unsanitary cell for eleven days could not prove an Eighth Amendment viola- tion because of the "relative brevity" of his stay ... particularly when cleaning sup- plies were available to him. Other courts have likewise found that certain conditions are not cruel and unusual because the inmate was subjected to the condition for only a short period of time. See, e..g.... Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235 -36 (7th Cir.1988) (plaintiff "experienced considerable unpleasantness" for five days due to "filthy, roach - infested cell "). Douglas, 16 F.3d at 958. The Court warned that conditions could be deemed unconstitutional, even if only for a short period of time, if the conditions deprive a person of an identifiable human need and are created under inhumane circumstances. See Gordon v. Faber, 973 F.2d 686, 687 -88 (8th Cir. 1992)(holding prisoners outside for two hours in winter weather without property cloth- ing). The point, though, is that the mere fact cells are overcrowded does not mean that conditions are unconstitutional . See Goldman v. Forbus, 17 Fed.Appx. 487, 488, 2001 WL 838997 (8th Cir. 2001)(pretrial detainee slept on the floor next to toilet for six nights); Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 268 n.4 (8th Cir. 1996)(detainee confined in cell with overflowed toilet for four days); White v. Nix, 7 F 3d. 120, 121 (8th Cir. 1993)(detainee contained in unsanitary cell for 11 days). The reference to these cases does not suggest that the Sheriff should mistreat any detainee entrusted to his care. However, the importance of these cases is that overcrowding, without more, does not create an unconstitutional condition. Further, the decision about constitutionality is not made by a county executive employee like the Sheriff, it is determined by the judiciary. Even deplorable conditions do not violate the U.S. Constitution if the County provides the means to alleviate the conditions, e.g. have prisoners clean their own cells and provide the cleaning mate- rials to do so. Perhaps, then, questions that the need to be answered include: (1) In terms of space, whatt steps have been taken to see how many prisoners can be maintained if they slept on the floors in the dayrooms of the PCRDF, as well as being double or triple bunked in the cells? (2) What steps can be taken to place mats in a pile during the day to provide room in the dayroom? .Y OFFICE OF THE CITY .ATTORNEY Memorandum to Mayor Stodola & Members of the Board of Directors Re: Issues Concerning the Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility 13 August 2007: Page 7 of 9 the laws and the Arkansas Constitution and within the requirements of the United States Constitution]. Ark. Code Ann. § 12-41-503 (b) (West Supp. 2007)(emphasis added)(reference to subsection(a) added). Nothing in this statute gives a sheriff the right to refuse a person sentenced to imprison- ment by a district court judge. More to the point, in sentencing anyone to a term of imprison- ment, a district court judge acts as a state judicial officer in just the same way that a circuit judge does. Finally, even if there were any such rule, there is nothing in the Memorandum of Agree- ment between the City and Pulaski County that permits this kind of discrimination by the Sheriff. (b) ISSUE: Whether maintaining a contract with the federal government to hold federal prisoners is appropriate when the jail cannot meet its obligations to the local governments. (Page 8 of the UALR Report). It is stated that both state and federal prisoners are maintained at the PCRDF. While the State probably can determine when, and for how long, to keep its prisoners at a county jail, it appears that the County's decision to contract for federal prisoners is voluntary. The number of state and federal prisoners averages 260 prisoners. What the UALR Report does not address is why the County maintains this contractual relationship with the federal government when it cannot meet its obligations to the local governments? The report notes that there is a slight "profit" from the reimbursement the County receives for housing federal prisoners, but it does not address why the County continues such an agreement under the circumstances. Since there are federal prisons in -- Texarkana, Memphis, and Forrest City, it is clear that the federal government has alternatives to use of the PCRDF. It may not be as convenient for the federal government, but neither is it con- venient for law enforcement agencies in Pulaski County to have to release, almost immediately, persons arrested for crimes because there is no space in the jail. The illustration on page 9 of the UALR Report notes that 526 federal prisoners were booked into the PCRDF in 2005; what it does not provide is how many local prisoners could not be accepted because of these 526 prison- ers; the offenses which these local arrestees had committed; and, the average length of a federal prisoner's stay. (c) ISSUES: Medical treatment of detainees (Page 12 of the UALR Report) The report makes more than one statement as to the responsibility for medical treatment that suggests there are no alternatives. For example, at page 12 the following statement appears: Those who believe that the University of Arkansas Medical School should assume responsibility for health care costs appear not to understand the law regarding the re- sponsibility for the health care of jail detainees. There is no support cited for why the University system would make this assertion. Of course, state statute mandates UAMSC to provide indigent care. Ark. Code Ann. § 6 -64- 501 (West 2004). Since this statute is part of the education laws of Arkansas, it is obviously a OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY Memorandum to Mayor Stodola & Members of the Board of Directors Re: Issues Concerning the Pulaski County Regional Detention Facility 13 August 2007: Page 6 of 9 (3) Is the County willing to have detainees participate in cleaning the cells so that conditions are kept as sanitary as possible? (4) Will the PCRDF provide the means to wash clothes, or blankets, that may be splashed with dirt, waste, or urine, during the evenings? There are surely additional questions, but the overarching inquiry is whether the County is wilI- ing to do all that it can to provide the best possible conditions and at the same time accept all prisoners presented to it, for incarceration? If the answer to this last question is yes, and the local officials continue to seek revenue sources to help with incarceration, then the County and the Sheriff cannot be held to be deliberately indifferent to the conditions in the jail. II. MEDICAL TREATMENT This issue has been dealt with in some detail in the past. While it is true that the County has a constitutional duty to make needed hospital care available to a detainee, neither the County nor the Sheriff is required to pay for that treatment. If the detainee is indigent, then the County need only take the person to a hospital that treats indigents, and not accept financial responsibility for such treatment. A previous memorandum is attached as an exhibit with explores this issue fur- ther. III. SOME ISSUES ABOUT THE UALR REPORT While the below is not an exhaustive review, there are some statements that the UALR Re- port makes which are not consistent with state or federal law. These examples are provided as a sample for review. (a) ISSUE: Whether persons sentenced to imprisonment from district courts must be accepted by a county ,jail. (Page 7 of the UALR Report) In the UALR Report the following statement appears: The district courts are absent from the illustration because the PCRDF typically does not have space to accommodate persons the district court judges might wish to de- tain. While the Sheriff must accommodate a person sent to the jail by a circuit court judge, the Sheriff is not under the same obligation to a district court judge. (italics added). Unfortunately, the UALR Report provides absolutely no basis for this statement. State law, on the other hand, is quite clear: Neither a sheriff nor another keeper or administrator of a jail shall refuse to accept any prisoner lawfully arrested or committed within the jurisdiction of the supporting agency of the jail except as necessary to limit prisoner population [to comply with 0171 CI OP' THE CITY ATTORNEY Memorandum to Mayor stodola & Members of the Board of Directors Re: Issues Concerning the Pulaski Comity Regional Detention Facility 13 August 2007: Page 8 of 9 reference to the fact that UAMSC, and many of its doctors, are provided substantial financial support by the State. It is true that this statute would permit UAMSC to determine a methodol- ogy to assess partial payment to counties and cities with a population in excess of 10,000, but UAMSC has never developed such a formula. So, while the obligation to treat indigents is pre- sent, the fact that UAMSC cannot assess the County or the City any costs for such treatment is simply because the University has not developed the formula to do so. The significance, though, is that the UALR Report neither discusses, nor refutes, the following from the U.S. Supreme Court and the Arkansas Supreme Court: If, of course, the governmental entity can obtain the medical care needed for a de- tainee only by paying for it, then it must pay. There are, however, other means by which the entity could meet its obligation. Many hospitals are subject to federal or state laws that require them to provide care to indigents. Hospitals receiving federal grant money from the Hill- Burton Act, for example, must supply a reasonable amount of free care to indigents. See 42 'USC § 291c(e) [42 USCS § 291c(e) ]. In the Commonwealth of Massachusetts now, any hospital with an emergency facility must provide emergency services regardless of the patient's ability to pay. Mass Gen Laws Ann, ch 111, § 70E(k) (West), added by 1979 Mass Acts, ch 214, and amended by 1979 Mass Acts, ch 720. Refusal to provide treatment would subject the hospital to malpractice liability. § 70E. The governmental entity also may be able to satisfy its duty by operating its own hospital, or, possibly, by imposing on the willingness of hospitals and physicians to treat the sick regardless of the individual patient's ability to pay. Union County v. Warner Brown Hosp., 297 Ark. 460, 463 -64 (1989). Or, as the U.S. Supreme Court stated The Due Process Clause, however, does require the responsible government or governmental agency to provide medical care to persons, such as Kivlin, who have been injured while being apprehended by the police. In fact, the due process rights of a person in Kivlin's situation are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protec- tions available to a convicted prisoner. We need not define, in this case, Revere's due process obligation to pretrial detainees or to other persons in its care who require medical attention. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 312, n. 11 (1982); Norris v. Frame, 585 F.2d 1183, 1187 (3rd Cir. 1978); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291 (4t" Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980). Whatever the standard may be, Revere fulfilled its constitutional obligation by seeing that Kivlin was taken promptly to a hospital that provided the treatment necessary for his injury. And as long as the gov- ernmenlal entity ensures that the medical care needed is in fact provided, the Consti- tution does not dictate how the cost of that care should be allocated as between the entity and the provider of the care. That is a matter of'stale law. City gfRevere v. Massachusetts General Hasp., 464 U.S. 239, 244 -45 (1983)(emphasis added). OFFICE OF TIFF, CITY ATTORNEY Memorandum to Mayor Stodola & Members of the Board of Directors Re: Issues Concerning the Pulaski County, Regional Detention Facility 13 August 2007: Page 9 of 9 In a very recent case, a U.S. District Court in the Eighth Circuit held: With regard to [state statute] which makes prisoners financially liable for medical care provided to them while confined in a jail, the Court notes that ... [a] fair read- ing of the statute indicates that it is designed to help jails defray the costs of provid- ing medical care by shifting the financial burden to the detainee's private health in- surance provider or, if lacking insurance, to the detainee... Because there is no indi- cation that the levy is imposed for punitive reasons, it does not rise to the level of a violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights... Moreover, while the .Jail has an obli- gation to provide medical care to persons in its custody, the Constitution does not dictate how the cost of that care is to be paid. Hammer v..S'tevens, 2007 WL 1565933 at *3 (E.D. Mo. May 29, 2007)(emphasis added). Why the UALR Report did not address this issue more fully is particularly confusing. Prior to the beginning of its research, a copy of the 29 November 2005 memorandum from this office on the Cost of medical care for prisoners was provided to the committee drafting the report. A copy of the memorandum is attached to this memorandum for your review. CONCLUSION There is no doubt that the desire to keep persons charged with crimes in a secure location while they await trial, or to have persons convicted of misdemeanors incarcerated when a court orders such incarceration fulfills a legitimate governmental function. In Pulaski County, this de- sire is not met because the County and the Sheriff do not accept all persons presented for incar- ceration. This memorandum is an update on issues that have been presented previously. Before the Board of Directors are two resolutions for discussion which outline specific action the Board may wish to take to resolve the failure of the County to take prisoners presented by the Little Rock Police Department, or the District Courts of Little Rock. To preclude having to continually release persons jailed for serious felonies, or even misdemeanor failure to appear -- sometimes for the third or fourth time -- and. for other matters, serious and forthright action needs to be taken. TMC:ct cc. Bruce T. Moore, City Manager Bryan Day, Assistant City Manager Stuart Thomas, LRPD Chief of Police att. h�